analysis (Hu; Dellenbarger, Luzar, and Off-flavor in catfish restricts farm marketSchupp), grocery store demand (Raulerson ings 10 to 45% depending on the season. The and Trotter), and wholesale demand (Kineconomic impact on society of this imposed nucan) and as such are too few and limited in supply restriction depends, in part, on the scope to permit generalization about elasticity of demand for catfish. Econometric elasticities or other demand parameters. estimates based on disaggregated processing
mand and pricing parameters affecting the (Miller, Connor, and Waldrop) . To simplify the catfish industry and (2) to determine the analysis and permit focusing on farm-level depotential gains to society of resolving the offmand, we combined the two product forms inflavor problem. Catfish demand is modeled usto a composite commodity called "processor ing a systems approach in which the processsales." ing sector is viewed as imperfectly comCatfish processing is a concentrated inpetitive (Kinnucan and Sullivan) . The threedustry with five firms accounting for 98% of equation system, based on a price-setting total pounds processed in 1980 (Miller, Conbehavioral hypothesis recently suggested by nor, and Waldrop). Advertising and pricing French and King, is estimated via three-stage behavior reflect this concentration. In parleast squares to yield elasticities of wholesaleticular, price is determined using a cost-plus level demand and farm-to-wholesale price process: "Prices are first computed based on transmission. These elasticities are then used the purchase price of the live catfish and to derive an estimate of the farm-level price the processing, packaging and handling costs. elasticity. A social welfare function incorThen, the transportation cost of distributing porating the farm-level demand elasticity is the fish is added to the above cost to form the derived and used to estimate returns to society base price. This base price is marked up to infrom lifting the off-flavor imposed supply conelude a profit. This mark-up is adjusted trol.
periodically, based on feedback from the market" (Miller, Connor, and Waldrop, p. 15) .
BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND
Price at the farm level is influenced by an in-CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK formal bargaining association which enThe demand for catfish at the farm level has courages producers not to sell below a preset three sources: specialty restaurants, fee amount (Dillard) . The term "going rate" fishing, and processing plants. Processing used to describe this price is suggestive of the plant demand predominates, however, accouneffectiveness of the association (Miller, Conting for 80% of farm marketings (USDA, nor, and Waldrop). Thus, farm price may be 1982). Hence, in analyzing demand for catfish viewed as predetermined. at the farm level, it is appropriate to focus on In addition to farm price, imports of catfish processing plant behavior.
and farm-processed supply are assumed to be Trade, product forms, marketing practices, predetermined. Imports of catfish, primarily institutional arrangements, and competition from Brazil, are related principally to external are important factors to consider in modeling forces such as the price of fuel, biological processor behavior. In the trade area, U.S. excycles in fish production, U.S.-Brazil exchange ports of catfish are minimal but imports have rates, and the U.S. consumer price of fish. The been a factor, accounting for 15% of processed farm supply of catfish is predetermined by exsales during the sample period . Imisting acreage, disease and off-flavor probported catfish enter the country in processed lems, and weather-related production cycles. form and are repackaged and sold to retail As suggested by French and King, when an grocery outlets (Giachelli) . Imported catfish, industry is imperfectly competitive, a model therefore, compete directly with domesticallybased on a price-setting hypothesis may be processed catfish at the retail level.
more appropriate than the quantity-oriented Processors sell catfish in two basic product models of perfect competition. The behavioral forms, fresh (ice pack) and frozen, represenassumption of price setting by the processor ting 60% and 40% of volume, respectively implies a three-equation system: (1) a (quantity dependent) demand function, (2) a price-
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EMPIRICAL MODEL markup relation, and (3) an inventory-change
The empical model consists of three strucidentity. The demand function describes tural equations (see Table 2 for variable definimovement of the processed product during tions): the marketing period in response to the price set by the processor. Feedback on whether Processor demand relation: the price set during the marketing period was too high or low occurs in the markup relation (1) QDNit =a + aiRPPit+a2RYNt+
via an ending inventory variable. The inventory change identity, which defines ending ina3MNt+a4Dlt+a5D2t+ a6D3t+Elt. ventory as equal to beginning inventory plus production less sales, closes the system. The Price-markup relation: three-equation system consists of three jointly determined variables: processor sales, proc- FOB processor price as a function of input put. Seasonality variables are included to test costs, inventory levels, and seasonality facthe hypothesis that markups are adjusted in tors. Major input costs are hypothesized to be response to perceived seasonal shifts in the the real price of live catfish (RFP) and the real supply of live catfish and demand for the pro-U.S. minimum wage (RMW). The minimum cessed product. wage rate is used because most line
The RFP and RMW variables are expected employees over the sample period received to have negative coefficients because they the minimum wage (Giachelli) . The ending inreflect costs. Processors are hypothesized to ventory variable (EIN) is jointly determined reduce output prices in response to rising inwith price (RPP) and movement (QDN). The ventory; hence, b 3 is expected to be negative. EIN variable reflects the appropriateness of No a priori expectations are placed on the the selected markup.
signs of the seasonal binary variables in equa-A lagged dependent variable is specified in tion (2) other than the (null) hypothesis that the markup equation to capture dynamic prothey are jointly zero. cesses evident in price transmission equations Equations (1) to (3) form a simultaneous involving short-interval data (e.g., Kinnucan equation system. The two behavioral equaand Forker). Uncertainty about the reactions tions are over-identified, lending themselves of rivals to a price change may cause an into estimation by two-stage least squares. dividual processing plant to delay setting a However, because error terms in equations (1) new price in response to cost changes. Also, a and (2) likely are correlated, the equations cost change may be viewed initially as temwere estimated as a total system using threeporary, causing plants to delay re-pricing outstage least squares.
ESTIMATION RESULTS well, with coefficients of the demand (markup) The estimated demand and price-markup equation tending to decline (increase) in value equations are presented in Table 3. 4 R 2 in each succeeding quarter. statistics show the markup specification "exon c atish deman simae coeiciens aefe plaining" 94% or more of the observed intrao catfish demand Estmated coefficients are plant variation in FOB prices, but there is less sigficant at the 5% level or lower for only explanatory power for the demand equations. 5 the two plants, A and B. For these two plants, explanatory power for the demand equations. t e icm e is n t conStatistics to test for serial correlation are the estimated income effect is negative, coneither inconclusive or indicate no serial corsstent with other studies (Hu; Dellenbarger, relation at the 1% significance level for nine of Luzarand Schupp). The negative income ef the 10 estimated equations. 6 Signs of the coeffect reflects an image problem acknowledged ficients generally agree with a priori expectaby the industry: catfish is often viewed as a tions, especially the price and seasonality low-income food commodity. Success in overvariablesi the deand ean coming the dmage problem may be reflected in tors and inento in m the positive income effects estimarkup rted, albeit The key variables in terms of the research obless precisely, for plants D and E, the largest jectives of this paper (RPP and RFP) are of the five. As the largest plants, D and E significant at the 1% level in six of the 10 probably spend more for advertising and proestimated equations. The lagged dependent motion to differentiate their products from variable is of the correct sign and significant rvals. Moreover, these two plants have a at the 5% level or below for all five plants, suprelatively greater proportion of sales conporting the hypothesis that changes in input sisting of value-added products. The income cost are not immediately passed on to buyers. coefficients for plants D and E may represent Before proceeding to a discussion of inthe relative appeal to higher income groups of terplant differences in coefficients, it should the more highly processed product forms. be noted that the demand equation for plant D
The hypothesis that imports undermine the contains a trend term. Unlike the others, industry is generally not supported by the plant D enjoyed steady sales growth over the s in which imorted catish comete plant D enjoyed steady sales growth over the statistical results (Table 3) . Due to limited sample period. Examination of the raw data markets in whic imported catfish compete for this plant revealed a steady increase in the market share (from proportion of sales described as "further pro-14.9% of industry volume in 1980 to 4.2% in proportion of sales described as "further processed," a fact that might explain the sales 1983(USDA 1980-83)) the general lack of trend. The positive coefficient for the trend significance of the import effect is not surpristerm supports this hypothesis. Moreover, ining. elusion of a trend term resulted in an Estimated coefficients of ending inventory estimated own-price effect that conformed are negative for all five plants but significant more nearly to those of other plants, sugat the 5% level (based on a one-sided t-test) for gesting that failure to account for time-related plants B and E only. Relative to the costs of changes in product form was biasing the live fish, labor, and seasonality factors, these estimate.
results suggest that inventories play a minor Seasonal coefficients tend to differ from zero role in markup behavior. in both of the estimated equations, suggesting P EAST TI significant seasonality in demand and markup PRICE ELASTICITIES behavior. 7 A regular pattern is observed as Demand and (long run) price transmission 4 The model was estimated initially with pooled data. F-tests indicated significant differences among the five plants in both intercept and (price) slope parameters. This result, coupled with the unbalanced sample size across plants, led to a disaggregated analysis of demand. 5 The system R 2 's (McElroy) were large, varying from .965 (plant E) to .996 (plant D). Individual equation R 2 's, based on second stage estimates, are reported because they appear to convey more accurately the explanatory power of each equation.
6 Reported D.W. and h statistics were computed from first-stage (OLS) estimates. Caution, nonetheless, must be exercised in interpreting the statistics because they generally are not independent across equations, clouding interpretation of the inconclusive region of the test (Theil and Shonkwiler) . 7 The following discussion of the structural equations is restricted to statistical significance of coefficients and agreement of signs with economic logic. Results from the reduced form are presented later, focusing on price effects. A complete matrix of reduced-form coefficients is in an appendix available upon request from the authors. elasticities, evaluated at data means, were elasticities across firms are similar (Table 4) . computed from the analytically derived re-A parameter important for determining the duced forms using the procedure described by economic implications of off-flavor (to be Chavas, Hassan, and Johnson. This procedure discussed later) is the farm-level demand involves manipulating the system so that the elasticity for catfish. Assuming a Leontif-type endogenous variable RPP in the derivative catfish processing technology (i.e., live fish aQDN/aRPP can be treated as "conditionally and other inputs are combined in fixed proporexogenous." Elasticities so computed are intions to produce the processed product), the terpreted as "total elasticities" because they farm-level elasticity is the product of the measure the percent change in one enwholesale elasticity and the farm-to-wholesale dogenous variable (QDN or RPP) per one perelasticity of price transmission (Gardner) . The cent change in another endogenous or exfarm-level elasticities derived in this manner ogenous variable (RPP or RFP), allowing all range from -. 08 for plant A to -. 69 for plant other relevant variables in the system to ad-D, indicating an inelastic demand for catfish at just accordingly. the farm level (Table 4) . Weighting the plantEstimated demand elasticities range from specific estimates by respective (sample) -. 44 to -1.59 but tend to cluster around -1.5, market shares and summing yields an agindicating that the demand curve faced by catgregate farm-level demand elasticity of -. 37. fish processors is price elastic. This finding is This estimate is somewhat below the lower consistent with an earlier study showing catbound estimate of Raulerson and Trotter fish demand at retail to be price elastic with (-.65) but is plausible given the time difan estimated coefficient of about -2.5 (Raulerferences of the two studies. The industry has son and Trotter). Kinnucan estimated an grown substantially since 1972 with concomielasticity at wholesale of between -. 85 and tant increases in processing plant size and -2.37, depending on the point of evaluation technical sophistication. The specialized along the demand curve, but the elasticity at nature of modern processing plants means no data means was estimated to be -1.54.
substitutes exist for live catfish at the plant Transmission elasticities showing the level. This fact, coupled with a processinglinkage between farm and FOB processor level demand elasticity that just exceeds uniprice range from .09 for plant B to .44 for plant ty, strengthens the notion of an inelastic de-D. The wider variation across plants in mand at the farm level. transmission vis-a-vis demand elasticities is consistent with the price-setting hypothesis.
IMPLICATIONS FOR OFF-FLAVOR Control over output prices permits deployIt was argued previously that off-flavor, by ment of pricing strategies to gain market reducing the supply of marketable fish, acts as share. Potential payoffs (and risks) to tinkera type of (involuntary) supply control. ing with price policy are enhanced when prodMoreover, since off-flavor affects fish uct differentiation is minimal, as appears to be throughout the year, the supply control is in the case with catfish because demand effect continuously. 8 This existence of a con- aEvaluated at mean data points. bComputed as a weighted average of preceding elasticities with plant market shares serving as weights. 8 The fact that off-flavor is present throughout the year and is not restricted to a particular season is important for modeling purposes. In particular, if off-flavor occurred intermittently-present in one season and absent in another-then a seasonal model is appropriate because off-flavor would simply reallocate supplies across seasons without affecting total supply. But the continuous presence of off-flavor means that average annual supplies of foodsize fish are restricted, justifying the modeling procedure adopted in this paper. Still, it is possible that an appropriately specified seasonal model, perhaps incorporating the effects of demand shifts, could refine our welfare estimates.
tinuous restriction on farm marketings of catas the sum of the changes in confish, coupled with an inelastic demand for catsumer and producer surplus) exfish at the farm level, implies that a new pressed as a proportion of initial technology solving the off-flavor problem (say equilibrium farm revenues; a chemical to treat pond water) may not be in r=the magnitude of the supply restricthe best interest of catfish producers.
tion expressed as a proportion of inIndustry success in obtaining public funding itial farm marketings; for research on off-flavor implies a need to Q0 =initial farm marketings before relaxknow whether the potential gain in consumer ation of the supply restriction; and welfare from the research is sufficient to offao, al=intercept and slope, respectively, of set potential producer losses so that a net the (inverse) demand function P = welfare gain can accrue to society as a result ao+alQ. of the investment.
While a definitive answer to the question of To implement equation (4), values for the depublic benefits from off-flavor research remand parameters are required. These were quires knowledge of catfish supply elasticities obtained from the following equations: and better information about the actual reduction in farm marketings, an estimate of the (5) ao=P0(1-l1/), and short-run social welfare impact is possible if one accepts certain assumptions. These are:
(6) al=Po/IQo, (a) the demand curve is linear, (b) the farmlevel demand elasticity is -. 37, (c) the annual where v is the farm-level demand elasticity, reduction in farm marketings caused by offand Po and Qo are the average farm price and flavor is 15%, (d) elimination of off-flavor farm marketings, respectively, for the time does not shift the demand curve, and (e) the period in question. concepts of producer and consumer surplus
The value for ASW', based on 1983 data are valid measures of social welfare at the points (Po = $.61 per pound, liveweight; Qo = farm level.
137.2 million pounds liveweight [USDA, 1983] ) These assumptions are treated as maintainand assumptions (b) and (c), is .120. This result ed hypotheses to facilitate computing welfare means that the short-run gain in social welfare estimates. It should be noted, however, that in 1983 is estimated to represent 12.0% of assumptions (a) and (b) are made for convefarm revenues. Based on 1983 farm revenues nience and not necessarily accepted as facts. If of $83.7 million, this estimate implies an abassumption (d) is not correct (i.e., if eliminasolute potential gain to society of $10.0 million tion of off-flavor increases the demand for catif off-flavor could be eliminated. fish, which is likely because consumer conSensitivity analysis illustrated in Table 5 fidence in the product would increase), then shows the welfare estimates robust with the welfare measures understate the actual respect to the demand elasticity, but sensitive cost of off-flavor. Relaxation of assumption to assumptions about the magnitude of the (a) might either increase or decrease the supply restriction. This suggests that improvwelfare estimate, ceteris paribus. Sensitivity ed estimates of the social cost of off-flavor will analysis is performed to determine the depend more on obtaining better information economic implications of assumptions (b) and about the extent to which off-flavor reduces (c). Finally, the social welfare estimates refer farm marketings than on obtaining more strictly to short-run (fixed supply) effects. reliable estimates of the demand elasticity. With these caveats in mind, the following equation was derived to estimate the social welfare effect of eliminating off-flavor (see Ap-ONLUO pendix):
The demand and price-markup functions estimated in this study suggest that demand for catfish is elastic at the processor level but (4) SW' = [ap + /2 alQo (r + 2)] , inelastic at the farm level. These results have ao + alQO implications for the off-flavor problem affecting the industry. With an inelastic farm-level where demand, the increased farm marketings that would follow from the elimination or effective SW'=change in net social welfare (defined control of off-flavor would reduce total revenues received by catfish producers. larger plants capable of capturing the scale Revenues received by catfish producers economies that appear to be important in catrepresent cost to processors, thereby decreasfish processing (Fuller and Dillard) . ing aggregate expenditures for fish by procWhile this assessment of the economic imessors. The reduced cost of live fish coupled plications of off-flavor is ex ante in character with economies of size realized from higher and limited, strictly speaking, to short-run volume processing (Fuller and Dillard) sugimpacts, it does provide a useful first approxgest substantial cost savings to the processing imation to the societal cost of the problem. sector. Moreover, with lower production costs
The magnitude of the estimated short-run at producer and processor levels, catfish welfare costs (12.0% of farm revenues) corprices at retail could be reduced, resulting in a roborates industry perceptions that off-flavor more than proportional increase in retail sales is a pressing problem. The findings suggest that (because of an elastic demand). Expanded inresearch to solve off-flavor could yield attracdustry volume would permit utilization of tive returns both to industry and society.
APPENDIX
The formula to measure the net social welfare change associated with increased marketings can be derived with the aid of the following figure. In the diagram, an increase in marketings from Qo to Q1 lowers price from Po to P1. As a result of the lower price, consumer surplus (CS) increases by the areas A + B. The change in producer surplus (PS) (which is equivalent to total revenue when supply is perfectly inelastic) is represented by the area C -A. Note that unless demand is price elastic within the relevant range, the increased marketings will reduce producer surplus. The net change in social welfare (SW) is defined as the sum of the changes in consumer and producer surplus or: ASW = ACS + APS = area B + C.
The area of B + C can be determined as follows. First, let the linear demand curve be represented by: It is sometimes more convenient to measure changes in welfare in terms of deviations from initial total revenue. To express equation (9) in terms of initial total revenue (PoQo), first note by equation (7) (11) is an exact expression for relative welfare change assuming fixed supply and linear demand. If equation (11) is multiplied by 100, it expresses welfare change as a percent of initial industry revenues.
